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ABSTRACT 
 
Market access to export cocoa beans in many cocoa producing countries has improved 
greatly due to trade liberalization in the cocoa sector. This has been accomplished through a 
variety of policy instruments, primarily structural adjustment programs (SAPs). In reducing or 
eliminating the role of state-owned and operated marketing and exporting boards, cocoa-
producing countries have opened themselves up to foreign-owned corporate agribusiness 
exporting companies and producers have received a higher share of a lower world price. Trade 
liberalization was also accomplished through free trade agreements (FTAs) in a few countries 
from which the U.S. imports fewer cocoa beans than those that underwent SAPs. These major 
exporters also became World Trade Organization members in addition to the SAPs and FTAs.  
This study analyzes U.S. cocoa bean imports from ten major cocoa-producing and 
exporting countries during the pre- and post-liberalization period of 1970-2007 using the The 
gravity equation and the one-way fixed effects model. The objective was to measure trade 
creation for a WTO member that has undergone trade liberalization. Cocoa beans can serve as a 
proxy for any tropical commodity upon which a developing country heavily relies on for export 
revenue, such as is the case with Côte d‟Ivoire and cocoa, for example. Our results find FTAs 
and WTOs do contribute to increased U.S. cocoa bean imports at the one percent and ten percent 
confidence levels, respectively. 
 
JEL Codes: F10; F13 
 
Key Words:  Gravity models; Exports; Market liberalization; Cocoa; Fixed Effects, Random 
Effects and Pooled Models.   3 




U.S. imports‟ of cocoa beans have grown in recent years. This is due to increased cocoa 
production, lower world prices, greater centralization and efficiency in the supply chain, greater 
consumer demand for chocolate products due to the introduction of various niche markets, 
increased consumer per capita income, and trade liberalization, among other causes. Market 
access to export cocoa beans in many cocoa producing countries has improved greatly due to 
trade liberalization in the cocoa sector. This has been accomplished through a variety of policy 
instruments, primarily structural adjustment programs (SAPs).  
In reducing or eliminating the role of state-owned and operated marketing and exporting 
boards, cocoa-producing countries have opened themselves up to foreign-owned corporate 
agribusiness exporting companies and producers have received a higher share of a lower world 
price. U.S. and European transnational corporations have become increasingly involved in more 
aspects of the cocoa bean supply chain, becoming the buyers and exporters of cocoa beans in 
producing countries with the scaling back or dissolution of commodity marketing boards in those 
countries. These corporations have also centralized grindings from a number of companies into 
the control of a few, larger corporations and have increased grindings in the producing countries. 
Trade liberalization was also accomplished through free trade agreements (FTAs) in a 
few countries from which the U.S. imports fewer cocoa beans than those that underwent SAPs. 
This study also discusses the role that the World Trade Organization (WTO) has in agricultural 
negotiations. This section presents an overview of trade liberalization in the cocoa industry, 
changes in the market structure of exporting and marketing companies, and the U.S. market for 
cocoa beans and products.    4 
Prior to trade liberalization, cocoa trade was inefficient and the share of the f.o.b. price 
received by farmers small (Varangis & Schreiber, 2001). Marketing boards were largely 
responsible for these faults, taking the lion‟s share of the f.o.b. in taxes while returning only 
some of it in the form of extension services and seed varieties. Many farmers smuggled to 
neighboring countries when those countries‟ market price was higher than their own, inflating 
export figures for the higher-priced countries and deflating prices for lower-priced countries 
(Bulíř, 2003). Cocoa exports were on the decline in many countries, such as Nigeria, where 
exports in 1985 – after the implementation of SAPs – were still below their 1970 levels, as oil 
became more vital to that country‟s economy (Kwanashie, Ajilima & Garba, 1998). 
Following historically low prices in the 1970s, many cocoa producing countries 
underwent trade liberalization under SAPs from the World Bank and IMF. In Nigeria, SAPs 
were used as the “only alternative” toward improving agricultural output (Kwanashie, Ajilima & 
Garba, 1998). Marketing boards were restructured, replaced or eliminated and opened up to 
competition from private marketing and export companies. Beginning in the 1980s, these 
processes are still underway in Ghana and Côte d‟Ivoire, the two highest-volume cocoa-
producing countries in the world.  
Trade liberalization has had both positive and negative impacts. It has brought a greater 
share of the f.o.b. price to cocoa bean farmers (Varangis & Schreiber, 2001). This greater share, 
though, is of a lower world price as production has grown and prices have harmonized across 
borders (Figure 3, Gilbert & Varangis, 2003). Marketing boards‟ roles have been reduced or 
eliminated and transnational corporations have replaced them in buying and exporting cocoa 
beans (Fold, 2002). Exporting has also undergone centralization, as these transnational firms 
have exercised comparative advantage against smaller firms (Fold, 2001). But by opening up   5 
markets to foreign competition, farmers have become more vulnerable to price fluctuations, great 
and small, on the world market. World prices have also converged between countries and fallen 
during the trade liberalization period (Figure 1). For U.S. imports, trade liberalization has 
signaled lower world prices for firms buying cocoa beans from producing countries and lower 
prices for U.S. consumers buying the cocoa and chocolate products derived from them.  
The move under trade liberalization from protectionist agricultural commodity policies 
toward open market policies for cocoa beans has implications for other commodities, as well, 
such as coffee, tea, sugar and cotton. These issues are especially relevant during the current Doha 
Round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, which are at an impasse as developing 
countries whose economies are dependent on agriculture square off against industrial countries 
seeking the developing countries‟ full market liberalization for agricultural goods.  
This study researches the effects of trade liberalization and U.S. cocoa bean imports from 
ten major cocoa-producing and exporting countries for the pre- and post-liberalization period of 
1970-2005. These countries are Brazil, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria and Papua New Guinea. At issue is not the countries‟ 
unwillingness to liberalize trade, as their governments have taken, willingly or unwillingly, the 
first steps through SAPs, FTAs and GATT/WTO membership to liberalize their agricultural 
markets, but to measure the potential growth for cocoa bean-exporting countries if trade were 
further liberalized under WTO negotiations. The U.S. represents the second-largest export 
market for cocoa beans, behind the Netherlands, and there has been a growth in exports of cocoa 
beans to the U.S. under trade liberalization. The impasse in WTO negotiations stands in the way 
of development through trade for the developing countries.    6 
  As the U.S., E.U, the WTO, World Bank and IMF promote trade liberalization for 
developing countries, analysis of its benefits needs to continually be taken into consideration. 
Improper sequencing of trade liberalization could lead to disruptions for any economy, and for 
countries like Côte d‟Ivoire and Ghana, who receive a bulk of their GDP from cocoa exports, this 
can be disadvantageous. Also, given trade‟s potential for lifting millions of people out of 
poverty, trade liberalization has some potential to be extremely beneficial for farmers.Improved 
terms of trade for these countries can lead to further development in agriculture, as well as in 
other sectors. Increasing market access for their cocoa bean exports can help them achieve 
greater development and lift themselves out of poverty. 
The objectives of this study are to measure trade creation for WTO member countries that 
have undergone trade liberalization. We do this using the gravity model and to measure the 
impacts of further trade liberalization of cocoa markets. The specific objectives are to provide 
descriptive analysis of marketing/distributing channels of U.S. cocoa bean imports from these ten 
countries,  apply gravity models to econometrically determine the effects of trade liberalization 
and other economic factors on cocoa exports in a panel data setting; and to provide policy 
recommendations. Originally inspired by Newton‟s gravity equation in physics, the gravity 
model has become popular in regional science for describing and analyzing spatial flows.   
Gravity Model 
Anderson (1979) was the first to draw linkages to economic theory that was pioneered in 
the analysis of international trade by Tinbergen (1962); Pöyhönen (1963); and Linneman (1966).  
The generalized framework Anderson developed incorporates the Armington assumption, that 
goods produced by different countries are inherently imperfect substitutes by virtue of their 
provenance.  Under the assumption of monopolistic competition, each country is assumed to   7 
specialize in different products and to have identical homothetic preferences.  Zero balance of 
trade is also assumed to hold in each period. Anderson built on the ordinary variables of dollar 
flow of a good from one country (or group of countries) to another as the dependant variable, and 
both parties‟ incomes (often measured as GDP), populations, the distance between the two 
parties and an error term, lognormally distributed with an expected value of 0. 
As stated in the previous section, the gravity model was originally inspired by Newton‟s 
gravity equation in physics and has become popular in regional science for describing and 
analyzing spatial flows.  The basic gravity model is often expressed as follows:  
(1)  tfij,t = f (Gi,t,Gj,t,dij,t)                  
where 
  tfij =  value of trade between countries i and j, 
  Git & Gjt = income of countries i and j and is positively relate to trade,  
  and a negative function of dij , the distance separating the two trading partners signifying 
transaction costs of commercial activity. 
 The generalized framework Anderson developed assumes Cobb-Douglas expenditure 
system and incorporates the Armington assumption that goods produced by different countries 
are inherently imperfect substitutes by virtue of their origin.  Each country specializes in 
different products and has identical homothetic preferences under the assumption of 
monopolistic competition.  Zero balance of trade is also assumed to hold in each period.   
Recently, the application of gravity models has enjoyed a big revival.  However, this has 
not so much been driven by its more rigorous theoretical foundation (Anderson, 1979; 
Bergstrand, 1985, 1989, and 1990; Helpman & Krugman, 1985; and Helpman, 1987) but the 
opportunity to project bilateral trade relations (Hamilton & Winters, 1992; Baldwin, 1994).    8 
According to the traditional concept of the gravity equation, trade can also be explained by GDP 
and/or GDP per capita figures and both trade impediment (distance) and preference factors 
(common border, common language, etc.).  The economic framework in most cases was cross-
section analysis (Wang & Winters, 1991; Hamilton & Winters, 1992; Brulhart & Kelly, 1999; 
and Nilsson, 2000).  Only a few authors made use of (random effects) panel econometric 
methods (Baldwin, 1994; Gros & Gonciarz, 1996; Mátyás, 1997; and Egger, 2002).  Mátyás, 
(1997 and 1998) provides insights into the question of proper econometric specification without 
dealing with the issue of trading potentials. 
 
The Econometric Model 
According to the endowment-based new trade model with Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) 
preferences, bilateral trade is an increasing sum of factor income G, relative size S, and the 
difference in relative factor endowments R, and real bilateral exchange rate is denoted E . We use 
purchasing power parity, denoted PPP, in place of E. The presence of a free trade agreement 
between the producing country and the U.S. measured with the dummy variable FTA, and the 
effect of GATT/WTO membership is measured by the dummy variable GATTWTO.  As this 
organization enforces trade liberalization and we can be certain of steps toward trade 
liberalization in agriculture for all countries only for years the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) 
is in force, it could have been separated into pre-WTO and pre-AoA years denoted by a dummy 
variable 0, and post-WTO and post-AoA years denoted by a dummy variable with value 1. 
However, trade liberalization is not a process where a researcher can observe an import value 
and assign causation in a regression equation for increased or decreased import values under any 
liberalization policy. As such, if the country was a member of GATT or WTO, the value for   9 
GATTWTO is 1, and 0 if a non-member. Applying the typical cross-section gravity equation to 
study trade effects of liberalization policies, we can specify the model as follows: 
(2)  IMPVALijt = β0 + β1GDPit + β2GDPjt + β3PPPijt+ β4FTAijt + β5GATTWTOijt + εijt,     




ijt ij tj ijt u v w                           
 
 
with  ij u as the (one-way fixed or random) unobserved bilateral effect,  tj v as the (two-way fixed or 
random) unobserved time effect and  ijt w  as the remaining residual error. The Heckscher-Ohlin 
(H-O) bilateral trade determinants can be formulated as the GDP of the cocoa bean-producing 
country GDPit and U.S. GDPjt.   
IMPVALijt is U.S. cocoa bean imports deflated in real 2005 dollars from exporting 
country i to the U.S., denoted as j. GDPit is the real GDP of the exporting country i in the year t. 
GDPjt is the real GDP the importing country j in the year t. PPPijt represents the purchasing 
power parity between country i and country j in year t, expressed as national currency value of 
GDP divided by the real value of GDP in international dollars. International dollar has the same 
purchasing power over total U.S. GDP as the U.S. dollar in a given base year (2005 in PWT 6.3) 
(Penn World Table 2006, 2009). FTAijt and WTOijt represent the dummy variables of interest. As 
above, each takes the value of 1 if the country is a party to that trade liberalization policy and 0 if 
otherwise.  
  For the panel econometric projection of potential bilateral trade, many researchers have 
concentrated on the random effects model (REM), which requires that  ij u  ~
2 (0, ) u  ,  tj v  ~
2 (0, ) v  , 
ijt w ~ 
2 (0, ) w  , and that   ij tj u andv  are independent of the  ijt w .  Moreover, the Xijt (i.e. the   10 
explanatory variables) have to be independent of ij u ,  tj v and  ijt w  for all cross-sections (ij) and 
time periods (tj).  Whereas the fixed effects model (FEM) is always consistent in the absence of 
endogeneity or errors in variables, the REM is only consistent if the above-mentioned 
orthogonality conditions are fulfilled.  Then, the REM has the advantage of more efficiency as 
compared to the FEM.  If these conditions do not hold, only the FEM is consistent since it wipes 
out all the time-invariant effects (uij) and spatially-invariant effects (vtj).  The decision between 
the FEM and the REM models can be based on the Hausman (1978) test. Heteroskedasticity 
rarely occurs in time-series and panel data, but this study has corrected the errors through 
unequal variances resulting from different cross-sections through the FEM which assumes the 
intercept of each cross-sectional unit is different from the other and it never happened by chance. 
The choice between a one-way FEM and a two-way FEM was determined through 
problems with multicollinearity. GDPjt was found to be collinear with IMPVALijt in the two-way 
fixed effects model and an estimate was not able to be calculated. Dropping GDPjt from the 
regression equation presents problems for our analysis because importing country GDP is an 
important theoretical predictor for import demand, measured by IMPVALijt. Also, a Hausman 
statistic could not be calculated due to problems with rank between the REM and FEM. Because 
an estimate for GDPjt could not be determined, a Hausman statistic could not be calculated 
through the comparison of the REM and FEM estimates. Thus, this study utilizes the one-way 
fixed effects model as the aforementioned orthogonality conditions were not met.  
 
Data 
The gravity model is applied using panel data for the period 1970 to 2007 for U.S. 
imports of cocoa beans from ten cocoa producing countries (five Latin American, three African, 
and two Asian).  Data on nominal trade values (in $1000) for cocoa imports to the U.S. are from   11 
the U.S. Census Bureau publication, “U.S. Imports for Consumption” for the years 1970-1988 
and the U.S. International Trade Commission‟s Interactive Tariff and Trade Data Web from 
1989 to 2007, at http://dataweb.usitc.gov/.   These were deflated with CPI data obtained from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis‟ Economic Research Division, at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/.  The purchasing power parity was obtained from Penn World 
Tables, http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/, and GDP data (in U.S. $Billion) were obtained from the 
USDA ERS International Data Sets, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/macroeconomics/.  Data for 
FTA and GATT/WTO were obtained from Rose‟s (2004) WTO data set at the University of 
California-Berkeley Haas Business School at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/. As trade 
liberalization is not a process whereby a country “flips a switch” and becomes liberalized 
overnight or from one year to the next, a dummy variable for FTAs and GATT/WTO 
membership simplifies this political procedure greatly. However, as there are few measures of 
trade liberalization (tariff reduction would be one), using a dummy variable is at least practical. 
The U.S. does not have tariffs on cocoa beans, but rather processed cocoa products.  
The GATTWTO dummy variable was constructed with 1 representing full membership 
for greater than three months‟ membership for that year, and 0 representing less than three 
months‟ membership for that year. Three months was chosen because WTO could have some 
effect on a country‟s exports of its larger late harvest in Autumn. Entry years were obtained from 
the WTO web site. Trade liberalization was also measured by including a free trade agreement 
variable, FTA. Of the observed countries, the U.S. only has an FTA with Mexico, NAFTA, since 
1994, and the DR-CAFTA countries, starting at different dates per country after 2006.    12 
Estimation Procedure 
 
Problems with a zero-value dependent variable were present. Taking the natural logs of 
these would provide undefined values.  If a zero import value is present for a given country in a 
given year, it was left as zero in the analysis. In this analysis, several variations across individual 
country are analyzed in the one-way FEM, the two-way FEM, the one-way REM, and two-way 
REM.  The dependent variable, observed real value of U.S. cocoa imports IMPVALijt, was 
regressed on each exporting country‟s GDP GDPit, the U.S.‟ GDP GDPjt, distance Dijt, 
purchasing power parity PPPijt, and the presence of trade liberalization policies, FTAijt and 
WTOijt. Estimates for the other observable determinants impeding or inducing bilateral trade 
(common border, common language) dropped out in the final models together with distance as 
they are all time-invariant dummy variables. Linear, log-log, lin-log and log-lin variations of the 
one-way and two-way REM and FEM were used to determine the best fit. 
 
Results and Discussion 
To examine the empirical validity of the gravity model with respect to cocoa bean trade 
potential between U.S. and twenty-one exporting countries from 1970 to 2007 equation (2) is 
estimated.  The descriptive statistics of the variables in the model are reported in Table 1.  On 
average, the value of cocoa imports to the U.S. from 1970-2007 is about $77 million.  This 
statistic is no surprise as the U.S. chocolate industry uses very little of cocoa as an input – 5 to 10 
percent of the value of the bar (Gilbert and Varangis 2003).  The mean of GDP for exporting 
countries was $79.9 billion, with a minimum and maximum of $2.05 billion and $1.1 trillion, 
respectively. U.S. GDP ranged from $4.3 trillion to $13.1 trillion.  PPP ranges from 0 units to 
3105 units, with the mean being 109 units. Exporting countries were members of FTAs 3.9 
percent of the observations, and GATT/WTO 77 percent of the observations.   13 
Table 2 presents the country effect results for the one-way fixed effect panel estimators, 
while Table 3 presents the parameter estimation results for this regression.  According to the test 
statistics we cannot ignore the cross-sectional effects as the F-test for the one-way FEM is 
significant at (P < 0.0001) with R
2 of 0.57.  The F-test for the two-way FEM is also significant at 
(P<0.0001) with an R
2 of 0.63, but without an estimate for GDPj, the importing country‟s 
income, the two-way FEM cannot be a good predictor of cocoa bean imports (a demand 
function). Thus, the probability that there are no effects in the model is 0 and thus the probability 
of the one-way or two-way REM being a better fit is 0. A linear model yielded results more in 
line with expectations, as log-log, log-linear and lin-log models all yielded results that had the 
opposite signs expected, or had results that were not statistically significant. Past gravity 
equation studies have used log-log model results, but many of these analyzed whole sectors such 
as manufactures or agriculture, whereas this study only analyzes one commodity which is not a 
significant import by share of U.S. import values.  
Many country effects were also significant, relative to Papua New Guinea. For instance, 
for a $1000 dollar increase in Brazil‟s cocoa bean exports to the U.S., Papua New Guinea‟s 
cocoa bean exports will increase $192,111. For a $1000 dollar increase in Côte d‟Ivoire‟s cocoa 
bean exports, Papua New Guinea‟s exports to the U.S. will decrease by $18,687, suggesting that 
the U.S. will be purchasing more cocoa beans from countries exercising a comparative advantage 
in cocoa beans to satisfy consumer demand. Nigeria was the only country that showed no 
significant impact on exports from Papua New Guinea to the U.S.  
The coefficient of the exporting country‟s GDP is negative and statistically significant at 
(p < 0.0001). Thus, the larger the per capita GDP for the exporting countries the smaller the trade 
value of cocoa bean exports.  A one percent increase in the GDP of the exporting country will   14 
lead to a 0.04 percent decrease in the export value of cocoa beans to the U.S., possibly because 
that country is slowly developing and shifting away from the agricultural sector and into 
manufacturing or services.   
The GDP of the importing country is also significant, but negative. A one percent 
increase in U.S. GDP leads to a 0.09 percent decrease in U.S. cocoa bean import value.  This 
may be because cocoa makes up a small share of the U.S.‟ food expenditures and an increase in 
GDP would not necessarily mean an increase in cocoa bean imports, or that consumers with 
higher incomes are more often more educated about health issues and thus consume fewer cocoa 
products, due to their high fat and sugar contents. However, during the present recession, 
chocolate is a good that Americans still seem to be buying, perhaps more than before the 
recession began (U.S. News and World Report, 2009).   
PPP is significant and positive at (P< 0.0001).  An increase in PPP will lead to a 0.02 
percent increase in U.S. cocoa bean import value as the terms of trade improve for producers and 
they‟re able to purchase more inputs and other goods. 
 The dummy variables that are the focus of this study on trade liberalization, FTA and 
GATTWTO, are significant at (P≤ 0.01) and (P≤0.10) and positive. Trade liberalization appears 
to increase cocoa exports from producer countries per annum. Participation in FTAs lead to a 
0.0034 percent increase in the amount of cocoa beans imported by the U.S. Also, membership in 
GATT/WTO increases U.S. cocoa bean imports 0.026 percent. This could also incorporate gains 
made under SAPs and other measures, showing that trade liberalization on the whole has been 
beneficial under GATT/WTO, SAPs, FTAs and other measures to increase U.S. cocoa bean 
imports. This lends support to studies counter Rose‟s study (2004) that there is no empirical   15 
evidence that membership in the GATT/WTO increases trade, though with a 10 percent 
threshold, these results only lend mild support for the WTO tropical products deal. 
 
Conclusion 
  Economic theory informs us that at the individual country level, border relaxation 
reduces domestic prices that help local consumers and increases the profit for low-cost exporters 
through increased sales in the foreign market. At the global level, trade liberalization causes 
demand and supply to expand, both of which improve price signals and improves world welfare. 
Theory also teaches us that there are many other socio-economic and political-
institutional determinants of cross-border trade, including market size, geographical proximity, 
tastes and preferences, cultural ties, and financial linkages.  This paper used a linear one-way 
fixed effect panel estimation to determine the influence of the various factors driving the value of 
U.S. imports from major cocoa exporting countries. 
One noteworthy finding is that the GDP of exporting and importing countries decreases 
cocoa bean trade.  PPP also matters, as the terms of trade for cocoa-producing countries improve, 
so does their ability to produce as they choose to invest in cocoa forests and not in timber or 
products requiring fewer inputs.  But as producers‟ share of world price of cocoa through trade 
liberalization grows, production increases and the volume of exports rises.  Finally, important to 
this study on the effects of trade liberalization of cocoa bean producer markets on U.S. imports, 
trade liberalization through membership in the GATT/WTO and FTAs is shown to positively 
influence U.S cocoa bean imports from producing countries.  
Comparative advantage under trade liberalization has been shown to have a positive 
effect on U.S. cocoa bean imports, which would lead us to believe this trade would contribute 
positively to the terms of trade, holding other agricultural goods and industries equal. This would   16 
lead to greater development for the cocoa bean producers and give them a means to invest in 
their development, making increased education for the community, increased infrastructure, 
health care, or other goods harder for producers to afford. It could also lead to an investment in 
improving the quantity or quality of cocoa beans they produce or a divestment from growing 
cocoa altogether as demand from the U.S. increases. 
For the U.S., it gives consumers more cocoa beans with which to produce cocoa products. 
Though a small share of consumer income spent, it is still beneficial to consumers to purchase 
goods at a lower price, so long as producers benefit on the production end for a mutually 
beneficial relationship between trading partners. Ensuring that current and future agreements 
have language protecting both the consumers and producers so that the trading relationship 
continually improves between both partners for the development of the producers and the 
financial welfare of the consumer is important to the success of trade liberalization. Also, as 
noted in the introduction on the effect of trade liberalization on the political ecology of 
producers, it is important that trade liberalization protect the local environment for producers by 
working to improve information channels and other factors influencing production to keep prices 
equitable for producers to keep them from clearing more forests or using more agrochemicals 
which cause damage to the ecosystem. Organic and/or Fair Trade certifications offer producers 
increased prices on these niche markest. 
As FTAs were part of the trade liberalization analysis and have a significant and positive 
effect on cocoa bean exports, care should be exercised in future FTA negotiations and 
legislation, such as those with Colombia and Panama, and with cocoa-producing countries 
possessing FTAs with the U.S., such as Mexico, the DR-CAFTA countries, Chile and Peru, that 
the welfare of producers is improved through these agreements. FTAs should help producers   17 
increase their share of the cocoa price to improve the livelihoods of these people and their 
communities and their local environment. Fair Trade certification under FTAs is one such way to 
accomplish this. 
  As trade liberalization under GATT/WTO was shown to have a significant and positive 
effect on U.S. cocoa bean imports, it is recommended that care be taken in negotiations as the 
Doha Round of WTO negotiations goes forward so that membership benefits the development of 
producing countries specializing in tropical export products, like Côte d‟Ivoire and Ghana, and 
benefits U.S. consumers of chocolate and other cocoa products. The current negotiations of a 
broad deal on the treatment of tropical products, with the new WTO exception for bananas, in the 
Doha Round should offer producing countries a path toward increased development through 
increased market access, and not vice versa (ICTSD, 2010). Trade liberalization under SAPs has 
not proved well for import-substituting industrialization. For example, Ghana‟s economy is still 
very much focused on gold, cocoa and timber (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999). Smallholder 
dynamism can play a mitigating role in this, as evidenced by the Kuapa Kokoo cooperative in 
Ghana and its relationship with the Day Chocolate Company and Fair Trade Certification (Tiffen 
2002; Doherty and Tranchell 2007).   18 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Sum  Minimum  Maximum 
IMPVAL  380  77220  99412  29343437  0  529611 
PPPij  380  109.202  364.880  41497  0  3105 
Yi  380  144.331  241.912  54846  2.046  1072 
Yj  380  7992  2634  3036855  4262  13050 
FTAij  380  0.039  0.195  15  0  1 
GATTWTOij  380  0.771  0.421  293  0  1 
 
Table 2.  Fixed One-Way Country Effects 
 
Number of Cross Sections  10 
          Time Series Length  38 
         
              Fit Statistics 
          SSE  1.61E+12  DFE  365 
      MSE  4.40E+09  Root MSE  66352.66 
      R-Square  0.571       
     
              F Test for No Fixed Effects 
        Num DF  Den DF  F-Value  Pr > F 
      9  362  35.9  <.0001 
     
              Parameter Estimates 
        Country  DF  Estimate  Standard Error  t -Value  Pr > |t| 
Brazil  1  192.110  38.737  4.96  <.0001*** 
Costa Rica  1  -31.679  15.380  -2.06  0.0401** 
Cote d'Ivoire  1  186.871  18.056  10.35  <.0001*** 
Dominican Republic  1  41.236  17.688  2.33  0.0203** 
Ecuador  1  33.083  15.256  2.17  0.0308** 
Ghana  1  59.526  17.718  3.36  0.0009*** 
Indonesia  1  -42.886  22.954  -1.87  0.0625* 
Mexico  1  47.207  27.975  1.69  0.0924* 
Nigeria  1  22.936  18.095  1.27  0.2058 
* - Significant at 10% 
** - Significant at 5% 
*** - Significant at 1%   24 
 
Table 3.  Fixed One-Way Parameter Estimates 
 
Variable  DF  Estimate  Standard Error  t-Value  Pr > |t| 
Intercept  1  90.823  16.924  5.37  <.0001*** 
PPPij  1  0.117  0.014  8.46  <.0001*** 
Yi  1  -0.196  0.051  -3.85  0.0001*** 
Yj  1  -0.009  0.002  -4.81  <.0001*** 
FTAij  1  66.819  24.920  2.68  0.0077*** 
GATTWTOij  1  26.170  13.757  1.9  0.0579* 
 
* - significant at 10% 
** - significant at 5% 
*** - significant at 1% 
 
Figure 1.  Deflated Cocoa Producer Prices and Deflated ICCO Indicator Price, West 
African Countries (1985 = 100) 
 
 
Source: Gilbert and Varangis (2003) 